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K.G.B. Officers Try to Infiltrate Antiwar Groups

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COPENHAGEN — Over the last two years, the Danish and Swiss governments have exposed attempts by ostensible Soviet diplomats, actually K.G.B. officers, to influence or buy their way into groups trying to block deployment of new medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

The cases are the best evidence offered by Western counterintelligence officers who believe that the Soviet espionage agency's highest priorities in Western Europe include attempts to exploit the disarmament movement.

The counterintelligence experts are quick to acknowledge that there are

Tracking the K.G.B.

Last of three articles.

hundreds of thousands of people who oppose nuclear weapons and are not dupes of the K.G.B., of the local Communist Party or of the Soviet Union in any way.

Nowhere is the antinuclear movement regarded as a creation of Soviet policy. Rather, it is seen as an unusual target of opportunity for a full range of Soviet influence, extending beyond the K.G.B.

But in trying to demonstrate the Soviet efforts convincingly, Western officials run into problems. One is a reluctance to prosecute citizens involved in the antinuclear movement — where the K.G.B. has been conspicuously present

— because of risks of domestic political backlash.

In 1981, when the Danish Government ousted a Soviet diplomat, identified as a major in the K.G.B., for trying to buy a place in the debate on nuclear weapons here, a Dane was arrested in the case but not prosecuted.

Danish disarmament groups described the whole affair as an attempt to defame them.

Something similar happened in Switzerland this spring. The Government closed the Bern bureau of Novosti, the Soviet press-feature agency, threw out its local chief and forced withdrawal of a Soviet diplomat it said was the K.G.B. officer responsible for overseeing Novosti's local operations.

The Swiss explanation for the action was that the Novosti staff had grossly interfered in Swiss affairs, notably the antinuclear movement.

However, two Swiss citizens were not charged although they were named in Federal Attorney's documents as having assisted Novosti.

Excessive Reaction Charged

The complaints in Switzerland, which is neutral, were the same as those in Denmark, which is a member of the Atlantic alliance. Critics said that the Government had overreacted, that its case was thin and that thousands of decent and loyal citizens had been tainted only because they were active in disarmament activity.

Beyond domestic political sensitivities, another problem acknowledged by counterintelligence officials is the fuzziness of Soviet involvement in what the K.G.B. calls "active measures" — operations to create a political effect abroad, as opposed to collection of information on weapons, politics and technology.

Last year in Congressional testimony, the United States Central Intelligence Agency acknowledged its difficulties and echoed those of other Western intelligence services.

"Political influence operations are the most important but least understood of Soviet active measures," it said. "They are difficult to trace and to deal with because they fall into the gray areas between a legitimate exchange of ideas and an active measures operation."

Last March, the Federal Bureau of Investigation said in a report to a Congressional committee:

"We do not believe the Soviets have achieved a dominant role in the U.S. peace and nuclear freeze movements or that they directly control or manipulate the movement."

The F.B.I. added: "It is extremely difficult to determine the extent to which various peace organizations and coalitions are being influenced or manipulated by the Soviet Union."

Key Role for Local Communists

In Western Europe, a number of counterintelligence officials say that the attempts to exert influence are handled for the most part by the local Communist Party.

Soviet influence on the movements does exist, they say, but it is often — in a juridical sense — entirely legal. There is no reason for K.G.B. agents to tread where local Communist Party agents can carry out instructions of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee — the body in Moscow that also coordinates the K.G.B.'s tasks and priorities.

An internal briefing paper prepared in June by the West German Interior Ministry sought to evaluate Soviet intelligence involvement with the disarmament groups.

The Bonn briefing paper went on:

"They have this opportunity because they have been allowed into the coordination and planning organizations of the 'peace movement' and have been able

to create an audience and consideration. All experience shows that they are able to expressly hinder the acceptance or dissemination of positions that do not fit the political conception of the Soviet Union. As a result of the availability of the D.K.P. for the advancement of Soviet goals in relation to the 'peace movement,' there is no necessity for the direct intervention of the intelligence apparatus."

Sensitive Topics Manipulated

There are examples of the West German Interior Ministry's contention that the West German Communists are able to block discussion of matters uncomfortable to the Soviet Union.

In April last year, members of the Green Party attending the final organizational meeting for a large demonstration against President Reagan and NATO during a summit meeting in Bonn, accused the West German Communist Party and its friends of dominating the proceedings.

United States policy around the world was condemned by the Germans and motions against Soviet interference in Poland and Afghanistan were rejected.

The positions — those to be officially supported at the demonstration — were so unbalanced that some members of the Green Party said they were considering staying away from the rally.

They did attend but with their own banners and orders of the day.

The security agency of the Netherlands, in a confidential paper prepared for a meeting of NATO security officials late in 1981, linked the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Netherlands in a coordinated effort to influence the nuclear attitudes of Dutch church groups.

'Instructions From Moscow'

Directly dealing with the K.G.B., it said, "It is known that K.G.B. officers in the Netherlands have received instructions from Moscow to promote protests against the neutron bomb, but it is difficult to ascertain how they have put these instructions into practice."

The Dutch security agency, however, documented a K.G.B. forgery, sent to activists, newspapers and politicians that purported to be a U.S. military